Being taken for a ride: Privatisation of the Dar es Salaam transport system 1983-1998 by Rizzo, Matteo
J. of Modern African Studies, 40, 1 (2002), pp. 133–157. # 2001 Cambridge University Press
DOI: 10.1017}S0022278X01003846 Printed in the United Kingdom
Being taken for a ride:




This paper analyses the effects of privatisation and deregulation of the Dar
es Salaam transport system. It starts with an account of the decline of the
government-owned transport company and the first opening of the market
to private buses in 1983. The analysis then moves to the progressive de-
regulation of the sector and its impact on transport supply. Competition be-
tween private operators in the oversupplied market manifests itself in non-
compliance with safety rules, and inefficiencies in the fare structures. Labour
relations with the private sector are then examined to illustrate the logic of
the market. The results of a questionnaire answered by 668 workers suggest
that the reaction of casual workers to exploitative conditions of employment
characterises many aspects of the operation of the transport system. The im-
pact of deregulation is therefore most clearly to be seen in the nature of
labour relations within the sector, and it is argued that there is a need for
state regulation to monitor and enforce conditions of employment within the
private sector if service provision is to be improved.
introduction
Since the international financial institutions first identified privatisation
as a condition for assistance to developing countries, in the early 1980s,
the economic role of the state in central planning and regulation has
been in steady decline throughout sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). So
pervasive are the goals generally associated with privatisation that it
has been labelled an omnia ad omnes (all things to all men) policy (Adam
et al. 1992 : 3). The principal benefits that privatisation is intended to
bring about include the reduction of state fiscal deficits by the sale
of loss-making parastatals, the broadening of the ownership of
economic assets, increased productivity and improved efficiencies in
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redistribution. Above all, the ideological underpinning of privatisation
is the belief that, in the shift from public to private management,
the economy will benefit from the superior economic performance
of the private sector. Yet, despite the importance of privatisation in cur-
rent economic policies in SSA, a feature of the literature on its im-
plementation is the consensus on how little we know about its actual
impact and functioning (Bennell 1997 : 1785 ; Berg 1996 : 6 ; Cramer
2000 : 93). Part of the problem of evaluation is due to the fact that
the belief in the superior efficiency of the private sector has become
‘almost axiomatic ’ (Adam et al. 1992 : 3). Even the International
Monetary Fund (IMF)has struggled to assess the effects of privatisation,
in one of its reports on Tanzania providing evidence of ‘considerable
progress with privatisation’ in the fact that state involvement had been
removed from almost 60% of approximately 400 parastatal bodies by
mid 1998 (IMF 1999 : 15), but at the same time admitting that for only
one of these privatised companies was post-privatisation information
available on economic performance. The emphasis upon the
change of ownership, without reference to post-privatisation perform-
ance, thus turns privatisation from a means to an end in itself. In short,
while we know that privatisation is taking place, we remain very unsure
of its economic impacts.
A consensus is now emerging that privatisation does not necessarily
result in the creation of a vibrant private sector characterised by the
growth-enhancing competition that many had hoped for. With the
acknowledgement in a recent World Bank sponsored report, that
‘competition is more important than privatisation per se ’ (Campbell
White & Bhatia 1998 : 24), the state would seem to be creeping back
into the debate. Some commentators argue that state regulation might
be necessary where social and private costs and benefits do not
coincide, to offset the outcomes of perverse competition, and to ensure
that a firm acts in a manner consistent with social welfare (Adam et al.
1992 : 19). For example, in the case of the privatisation of the processing
and manufacturing of vegetable oils in Tanzania, Temu and Due
(2000 : 697) have found that whilst short-term profit maximisation was
achieved through the import of cheaper oils, this in fact hindered the
national economy through the loss of evaded taxes from imported
processed oil, a lowering of demand for locally grown raw materials,
and diminished employment opportunities for local people. Whilst such
examples serve to highlight the ambiguities of the economic impacts
involved, there remains a need for the rigorous assessment of the effects
of privatisation. In this respect, market structures, the reactions of the
privatisation of dar es salaam transport system 135
Table 1
Public buses in service 1974–1998
Year Operating buses Year Operating buses
1974 130 1986}87 101
1975 257 1987}88 109
1976 245 1988}89 70
1977}78 221 1989}90 59
1978}79 172 1990}91 32
1979}80 142 1991}92 25
1980}81 141 1992}93 36
1981}82 139 1993}94 54
1982}83 164 1994}95 40
1983}84 141 1995}96 32
1984}85 139 1996}97 24
1985}86 108 1997}98 12
Sources : Shirika la Usafiri Dar es Salaam 1995 : 6 ; Shirika la Usafiri Dar es Salaam (UDA), ‘Fleet
performance files ’ (1994}95–1997}98).
various actors within the sector, and the design of a set of rules seeking
to direct actors towards the desired functioning of the market, are all
features of the transition that must be closely examined. In any
example of privatisation, political choices must be made and these are
likely to be contingent upon the reactions – and perceptions of the
likely reactions – of the actors involved.
This paper analyses these dynamics and the effects of privatisation
for the deregulation of the Dar es Salaam transport system – the
operation of the city’s buses, or daladala." The first section describes the
initial regulatory framework of the system under the monopoly regime
up to 1983 and the dismal performance of the public transport
company up to that date. The next section analyses the progressive
deregulation of the sector and its impact on the supply side. The third
section evaluates the performance of the private sector. Increased
competition, resulting from the oversupply of the market, is suggested
as the most distinctive feature of the transition, to be seen in the
deepening exploitation of casual workers, increasingly pervasive non-
compliance with safety rules, and continued conflict between tariff-
protected student travellers and bus workers. In the final section, the
activities and role of the association of bus owners is outlined for this
period of transition.#
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the monopoly of the state (1970–1983)
With the Arusha Declaration of 1967, the government of Tanzania
embarked upon the ujamaa socialist strategy of development. A highly
interventionist state placed itself at the centre of the development
agenda. Whole sectors of the economy were nationalised, and in 1970
this process was applied to the transport system with the nationalisation
of the Dar es Salaam Motor Transport Company (DMT), a British
private company that had operated under a monopoly regime since
1947 (Mamuya 1993 : 108). In 1974, the nationalised company was
divided into two: the Kampuni ya Mabasi ya Taifa (KAMATA) became
responsible for inter-regional routes, while the Shirika la Usafiri Dar es
Salaam (UDA) was granted ‘an exclusive licence to operate public
omnibuses in Dar es Salaam’ (URT 1974). From the very beginning,
the performance of the nationalised public transport company was
disappointing. The dramatic decline is fully documented in Table 1,
showing a steady decrease in the number of buses operated by the
company, from 257 in 1975 to only 12 in 1998. This amounted to a
crisis of public transport, which in many respects mirrored the harsh
economic conditions experienced by the Tanzanian state since the mid-
1970s. Recurrent shortfalls in government funding made available to
UDA – which from 1974 to 1983 received only 35% of the foreign
exchange funds it had requested from central government (Stren 1989 :
52) – indicate the crisis but do not establish its cause. As foreign
exchange became a scarce resource, parastatals competing for shrinking
government funding responded by pushing up their annual funding
estimates, in an attempt to minimise the effect of inevitable government
cuts against the budget. Nonetheless, the government’s foreign
exchange shortage certainly played a role in the UDA crisis. But other
factors relating to the constraints placed upon the company were
perhaps of greater significance. Although UDA was formally expected
to operate on a commercial basis (URT 1974), government in fact
privileged the welfare function of public transport by keeping tariffs
low and subsidising the company (Mamuya 1993 : 110). As the
economic situation worsened, the shortage of foreign exchange made it
impossible to purchase the number of buses necessary to match the
increasing demand for transport ; at the same time, a lack of imported
spare parts delayed the repair of the existing fleet and slowly took its
toll on service provision.$ Poor public management of existing resources
was also a factor behind the crisis. Under-qualified personnel and
absenteeism are mentioned by UDA as causes of its difficulties by the
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early 1990s (UDA 1994 : 31–2). Furthermore, if one considers that the
average operating life of buses in service was shortened by the
deterioration of an inadequately financed urban road system from the
1970s to the 1990s,% then the complex set of causes behind Tanzania’s
public transport crisis become clearer.
While transport supply was in decline, demand was rising. In 1967,
Dar es Salaam had a population of 273,000. According to the National
Census, by 1978 this figure had nearly tripled to 769,000 (O’Connor
1988 : 136), and in 1988 the Population Census (Bureau of Statistics
1989) recorded the city as being home to some 1,360,850 residents.
Government was slow to respond to the increased demand that these
figures implied. From 1972 to 1974, the government did briefly tolerate
the activities of private operators alongside the public company, but in
1975 such operators were banned (Stren 1989 : 52). Opposition to the
private sector was at this time deeply embedded in the ideology of the
Tanzanian government. In a country whose leadership had set a
classless society as the final goal of the development strategy, a highly
progressive tax system and frequent increases in minimum wages were
the policies adopted to reduce the income disparity amongst the formal
sector workers. Yet Tanzania managed to substantially reduce the gap
between the maximum and minimum wage, whose ratio fell from 1 :50
in 1961 to 1 :7 in the early 1980s (Maliyamkono & Bagachwa 1990 :
30). From this perspective it is possible to understand why the informal
economy – where profits and wages were not subject to the state’s
redistributing action – was perceived by the authorities as a locus
where individuals could profit at the expense of others and therefore as
a threat to the establishment of a more egalitarian society. However,
the government’s adoption of policies that penalised activities within
the private sector, maintained until the mid-1980s, ran alongside the
decline of state economic capacity. As Mamuya (1993 : 111) has
calculated, by the time that private operators were again allowed
opportunities in transport service provision, UDA could satisfy only
about 60% of the total demand.
the road to market reform (1983–1998)
In 1983, transport service provision was opened to private operators.
This step was taken alongside new initiatives designed to strengthen the
public transport supply. The government issued a directive requiring
all ministries, government departments and parastatals to use their
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staff buses as commercial public passenger buses (Mamuya 1993 : 111).
As a consequence of the directive, 61 buses belonging to 27 parastatals
began to co-operate with the 141 operational buses of the public
company (Daily News 31.3.1983). In the private sector, the government
removed import restrictions and delegated the registration of private
operators to a committee in which the Ministry for Communication
and Transport, UDA and the National Transport Corporation were
each represented. Two aspects of the registration procedures have to be
stressed in order to understand the political climate in which the reform
took place. First, UDA was given sole authority to legally register all
private operators. Applications had to be presented to a section in the
Ministry for Communication and Transport, and then forwarded to
UDA for selection. To obtain a licence, private operators had first to
satisfy the safety requirements of the Traffic Police department.
Successful applicants were then allocated a route that they were
allowed to operate as sub-contractors of the UDA, for which they paid
UDA a monthly fee. These arrangements were defined in the contract
held by the UDA (URT 1974 : 2). Second, the government also
retained the power to set fares. Since the UDA licence stated that ‘ the
fares to be charged by the Company shall not exceed those approved
by the government or any other authority responsible for setting fare
rates ’ (URT 1974 : 2), private operators, as sub-contractors of the
UDA licence, were also compelled to operate at tariffs set by the
authority concerned.
These modalities of regulation reveal that the initial opening to
private operators of the Dar es Salaam transport system took place
without a substantial revision of the ideological underpinning of the
monopoly formerly held by the state. The public transport company
formally maintained its monopoly, while sub-contractors were con-
ceded monthly licences, leaving the government with the opportunity
to restore the monopoly at notice of no more than one month. It
therefore seems that the government at this stage saw the private sector
only as a means towards a temporary easing of the shortage of transport
supply, and not as a long-term structural change of public transport
policy. The ambiguities of this policy shift are apparent in the
statements made in a document published by the Ministry for
Communication and Transport (MCT 1987 : 49–50) four years later.
First, in clear and apparently unequivocal terms the Ministry stated
that ‘whatever the combination of polices adopted in each town, public
transport (rather than private transport) will be essential ’, going on to
explain that ‘ ideally, public transport, and in this case the bus, is and
privatisation of dar es salaam transport system 139
Table 2











Source : Shirika la Usafiri Dar es Salaam 1994 : 26.
will always be considered more efficient than private transport ’.
However, when discussing the specific case of Dar es Salaam, the same
document more pragmatically conceded that ‘other operators, in-
cluding private operators, can also be incorporated, but under the co-
ordination of one institution’ (ibid. : 50–1). Privatisation in transport
was only to operate under parastatal control, it seemed, and this only
within the city of Dar es Salaam.
The Tanzanian government therefore initially reacted to external
(IFI) and internal pressures for reform by restating the state’s
entitlement to continue to dominate access to the sector and to define
the modalities for companies applying for licences to provide transport
services. Initially, the response of private operators to this new
investment opportunity was modest. Official figures show that the
number of registered buses fluctuated for the period from 1983 to 1990.
In 1983, there were 178 private buses in service. By 1985 this had
climbed to 294, only to fall back again to 175 in 1989. The first buses
to be registered under the UDA’s new sub-contracted licences in Dar
es Salaam city had previously been operating on up-country routes.
The Dar es Salaam transport system represented a potentially lucrative
market for these operators, but despite this the number of daladala& did
not continue to increase. The main factor discouraging the registration
of private operators was that government tariff policy continued to
protect low-income groups, rather than fostering private profit. As is
shown in Table 3, although fares registered a 600% increase from 1983
to 1991, in the same period the domestic currency experienced a
devaluation of 1,836%. As buses and spare parts were necessarily
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Table 3
Tariffs and devaluation trends 1983–1991
Year 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Tshs}US$ 16.34 17.21 38.16 68.65 108.25 154.68 197.00 230.00 300.00
Tariff (Tshs) 5 5 5 6 6 8 15 15 15
Tariff (US$) 0.31 0.29 0.13 0.087 0.055 0.052 0.076 0.065 0.10
Source : Shirika la Usafiri Dar es Salaam 1994 : 22–3.
purchased with foreign currency, the devaluation severely hampered
any private entrepreneurs seeking to enter the daladala business. Hence,
it was only those operating existing buses on alternative routes who
were at first able to take advantage of the government’s limited steps
towards reform. Moreover, existing ownership patterns seem to have
had some impact upon trends in registration. According data from the
Ministry for Communication and Transport for 1989, a large majority
of operators owned only one bus. Only two entrepreneurs owned two
buses, and only one operator had more than five buses (Mamuya 1993 :
113). As a consequence, there were very few owners who were capable
of increasing their fleet from a business-generated capital base.
The next step in the gradual process of reform came in the period
1990–91, when it seems that changes in national policy had an impact
upon the daladala sector in Dar es Salaam. In 1989, the final tranche of
the 1986–89 structural adjustment programme agreed by Tanzania
and the IMF was initially withheld on the grounds that liberalisation
policy had to be ‘ faster and steeper ’ (Baregu 1993 : 111). The
government responded to this threat with the adoption of the
Investment Promotion and Protection Act in 1990. For investors this
Act meant, amongst other things, full exemption from import taxes,
and a five-year exemption from tax for newly established businesses
(ibid. : 111). The Act was accompanied within the Dar es Salaam
transport system by the adoption of a more profit-oriented tariff policy,
and by the abolition of state control on the number of licences issued
to private operators. Over the period from 1991 to 1996, daladala tariffs
increased fivefold, whilst the domestic currency experienced a
devaluation of only about 100%. The powerful effect of this new tariff
policy on private operators registration was confirmed by the general
manager of UDA, Kushoka, who reported that the number of daladala
trebled in the first six months after the doubling of fares in February
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Source : Shirika la Usafiri Dar es Salaam 1994 : 27 ; Central Transport Licensing Authority,
‘Microbuses Files ’, (1994–98).
Table 5
Tariffs and devaluation trends 1991–1996
Date of tariff review 3.2.91 11.2.93 9.10.93 7.1.95 20.12.96
Tshs }US$ 300 437 530 574 580
Tariff (Tshs) 30 50 70 100 150
Tariff (US$) 0.10 0.114 0.132 0.174 0.258
Sources : Shirika la Usafiri Dar es Salaam 1994 : 24 ; Africa South of Sahara  ; Daily News 8.1.1995,
31.12.1996.
1991 (Daily News 25.11.1991). With regard to state control on the
licensing of private daladala operators, in 1991 UDA was relieved of its
authority to sub-contract licences. The CTLA then became the only
agency responsible for handling registration applications (UDA 1994 :
28), but had no powers to reject any application except on the basis of
non-compliance with roadworthiness rules.
The shift towards a free market regime in the Dar es Salaam
transport system was subsequently completed by the progressive
deregulation of the tariff mechanism. The transition to a supply and
demand driven fare system began in 1996, the year in which the
general secretary in the Ministry for Communication and Transport
publicised that whilst transport operators could not charge fares above
the fixed fare, they could charge less (Daily News 31.12.1996), and was
completed in 1997 when the minister declared that bus fares would in
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future be determined solely by market forces (Daily News 25.7.1997).
These tremendous policy changes account for a dramatic increase in
the number of registered daladala from 600 in 1991 to 3,301 in 1998. By
the end of the 1990s, the Dar es Salaam passenger transport system was
almost entirely supplied by private operators under a free market
regime. Indeed, privatisation had gone so far that many people in the
city now fail to realise that the state-run UDA is still in operation. As
one of its officials lamented (Mlaki 1998) :
Amongst Traffic Police agents, the younger ones do not know what the UDA
is, as nowadays we have very few buses. One day they rang me from the Police
Central Station because one of our buses had been stopped by a young agent
who believed it was a pirate daladala operating without licence. I had to go the
Station to explain to him that we are UDA, that we have a licence allowing
us to operate in all areas of Dar es Salaam, and that at one time we were the
only supplier on the market.
the effects of deregulation
Moving to an assessment of deregulation, the first question to ask
concerns the extent to which daladala operators are in fact complying
with the new system of licensing. With the liberalisation of state
controls on daladala operation, it might reasonably be expected that
more private operators would be encouraged to participate in the
licensing scheme and that the numbers of ‘pirate buses ’ would decline.
However, it is apparent that a large proportion of private operators still
supply the market without a licence, despite deregulation. There are no
reliable regular statistics on the exact numbers of pirate operators, but
two surveys conducted at the beginning of the 1990s suggest that there
were then about as many unlicensed operators as those with licences :
in 1990 it was estimated that there were 202 unregistered daladala
operators, and 175 registered; in 1991, the figures were calculated as
338 unregistered and 355 registered operators (UDA 1994 : 26–7).’ A
more recent estimate, made by the president of the daladala owners’
association, suggests that there are as many as 7,648 daladala in
operation (Ndaombwa 1998). An article published in The East African
during 1999 provided an estimate of ‘6,300 plus ’ buses.( Both these
estimates again suggest that the numbers of unlicensed buses remains
close to the number officially registered, at somewhere between 3,000
and 4,000.
While this general impression is probably a fair reflection of the
situation, it must be acknowledged that monitoring of supply in the
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market is far from precise. My own survey of the data of three different
institutions concerned with the operation of private buses shows that
there is no consistent figure for the number of compliant private
operators. Data was collected in 1998 on daladala registered with the
City Commission (to which private operators have to pay a fee for the
maintenance of the road system), with the Tanzania Revenue
Authority (to which operators pay income tax), and with the Central
Transport Licensing Authority (which issues the licences for passenger
transport). While the Dar es Salaam City Commission (1998) reported
a total of 4,012 compliant vehicles, only 3,029 private operators are
registered as paying income tax,) and only 3,301 daladala are recorded
as having being issued a licence by the CTLA (1998). These divergent
figures suggest that operators comply with some of the state regulations,
whilst ignoring others. The choice between formality and informality
seems to depend on entrepreneurs ’ individual evaluation of the
comparative costs of legality and illegality, rather than on their
perception of the legitimacy of the government prescription. If, for
instance, a newspaper publicises that the Traffic Police have been given
the order to impound vehicles not paying the income tax, as in fact
happened on 12 March 1996 (Daily News 12.3.1996), then the potential
cost of illegality will be perceived to have increased and more operators
will elect to comply with this legal requirement.
Beyond differences in the payment of registration fees and taxes,
private and pirate operators share a general disregard for the
requirements of the safety regulations governing the operation of buses.
Non-compliance with road safety rules is clearly related to the
oversupply of the market brought about by its deregulation. The
existence of an oversupplied market can be deduced from the fact that
private operators were forced to decrease fares in order to remain in the
competition soon after the state abolished controls on the tariff. Within
one week of government announcements on the liberalisation of tariff
controls, a local newspaper reported that some daladala operators had
reduced fares from 150 shillings to 100 shillings (Majira 8.1.1997), and
it was observed during fieldwork that on most routes a fare of
150 shillings was charged only at peak times of the day, while the off-
peak fare was fixed at 100 shillings. The tariff war that broke out on
some routes was not the only form of competition evident among
private operators. The overloading of vehicles, divergence from
allocated routes, and speeding were practices deemed to be com-
mercially necessary by many operators in order to maintain a
competitive edge in a very congested market. It is worth remarking
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that the market seems to remain under conditions close to classical
perfect competition. There is no evidence of the emergence of groups of
entrepreneurs able to take advantage of their economic or political
power to squeeze out less competitive operators.
In a study of the taxi industry in three South African townships,
Xhosa (1992) has shown that saturation of the market, over-speeding
and the overloading of vehicles were the outcome of the deregulation
of the service. Xhosa reports that mafia-type gangs divided up and
controlled access to taxi routes in these townships, using guns and
violence to effectively enforce restrictions on other operators. While no
such pattern of serious criminality is evident in the case of Dar es
Salaam, perfect competition amongst private operators does have other
social costs. In 1992, 93% of all fatal accidents in Dar es Salaam
involved daladala (Daily News 17.5.1994). The use of the word ‘accident ’
seems inadequate because it implies an assumption of casualness which
does not explain the reality of the behaviour of many private operators.
The need for excessive speed is witnessed also by the names given to
some of the vehicles by their owners or crew. This naming of vehicles,
which reveals something of the informal actors ’ perceptions of the
environment in which they operate, is worthy of some attention. One
daladala is named Zig-Zag, implying the skill of its driver in overtaking
other buses ; another is Dawa ya moto ni moto [‘If you speed I speed’, but
more literally ‘ the medicine for the gas is the gas ’] ; another is named
Usipotambaa mswaki [‘If you do not run you will be a brush’], brush
being the slang word identifying a bus which ‘sweeps the road’ without
any passengers inside. Another bus has a drawing of two wrestling
fighters face to face with the words : ‘Warning: no ring, no rules, no
referee’. Another is named Mbele kwa mbele [‘Always ahead’], echoing
the daily challenge in the race track that is Dar es Salaam’s municipal
road system. A final example is a bus named Utamaliza kuni kwa
kuchemsha mawe [literally ‘You will burn the whole log to boil stones ’],
meaning that there is no point in trying to overtake me because you will
be no more successful than if you try to boil stones. These names, and
many others, suggest that a culture of non-compliance is indeed widely
pervasive and deeply rooted in city life, a body of rumours, gossip,
satire and new Swahili words witnessing, as Tripp (1997 : 179) has put
it, ‘ the gap between party policy and popular sentiments ’. However, it
is striking that this culture of non-compliance should have survived
long after the deregulation and privatisation of the market. Fur-
thermore, the culture of non-compliance expressed through daladala
names most often refers to the laws governing speed limits, which
privatisation of dar es salaam transport system 145
cannot reasonably be considered an unnecessary state regulation whose
change is long overdue. It has to be acknowledged that the necessity of
speeding is not shared by all private operators. One daladala severely
condemns the habit of over-speeding by the phrase, Huo ni utoto tu
[‘That is only infantile ’], and another adds Akikuwa ataacha [‘When he
grows up, he will stop it ’]. Another vehicle named Shame Less stresses
its difference from the majority of private operators. The same message
is given by the buses, Mwenda pole [‘It goes slowly’] and Tuliza ball
[‘Control the ball ’, invoking a popular footballing metaphor].
These antithetic attitudes of daladala workers towards the speed limit
derive from fundamental differences in conditions of employment
within the labour force. The analysis of the daladala labour market is,
in turn, fundamental to an understanding of private sector performance
and the social cost of the invisible hand of the market. Although we
know the approximate number of buses operating within the market,
the number of daladala employees is more difficult to quantify. Neither
the Ministry of Communication and Transport nor the Ministry of
Labour holds any statistical information on the daladala workforce.
However, as we know there to have been between 6,300 and 7,648
daladala operating in 1998, including both licensed and pirate operators,
it is possible to take the mean of these estimates (6,974), and calculate
the size of the workforce based on the number of persons employed for
each bus in operation. The number of workers per bus varies from two
(driver and conductor) employed on small buses (vehicles transporting
up to twenty passengers), to three (driver and two conductors)
employed on larger buses. Based upon the results of a questionnaire
(Appendix) distributed among bus workers, and which received 668
responses, it can be estimated that 44% of buses are of the smaller ‘ two-
man’ type, while 56% are the larger ‘ three-man’ type. On this basis,
the labour force employed in the daladala sector can be calculated at
about 17,800 workers.
The sample of 668 workers who responded to the questionnaire
therefore comprises about 3.75% of the total workforce. While the
results of this random sample must be treated with caution, it still
reveals much of interest about the functioning of the labour market in
response to privatisation and deregulation. The daladala employees
were asked about the characteristics of the working day (i.e. hours per
day, days per week, pay per day or per month), and the nature of the
relationship between employers and employees (i.e. the use of contracts,
kinship or other links between employer and employees). Rather
surprisingly, given the emphasis often placed upon the role of kinship
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in urban labour recruitment in eastern Africa, the results show that
90.7% of those workers sampled had an exclusively professional
relationship with their employer, while only 7.6% defined the employer
as a ‘relative ’, and 1.7% as a ‘ friend’. Less surprisingly, only 17.1%
of the sample were employed with a contract, while the remaining
82.9% were employed without contract. Taken together, these findings
strongly suggest that a large majority of workers in the transport system
labour market are employed on a casual basis, and that commercial
relations predominate in defining the terms of their employment. This
implies that in the Dar es Salaam transport system a substantial
number of informal actors constitute an exception to the orthodox view
of the informal sector as composed of firms where there is ‘ little or no
division between labour and capital ’ (ILO 1993 : 43), or ‘as home
based or individual enterprises with few or no employees ’ (UNDP: 5).
The distinctive feature of the daladala labour market seems to be the
existence of a class of bus owners whose interests are distinct from the
class of casual workers whom they employ. This poses analytical
difficulties for those, such as Tripp (1997 : 136), who write about ‘ the
conflict between the government and those involved in the informal
economy’, as it risks overlooking the importance of power relations
within the informal sector itself. As will now be demonstrated, conflicts
of interest between workers and their employers are a crucial dynamic
of the political economy of the daladala sector.
The relative ease of entry into the urban transport labour market has
a significant impact on the terms of employment. The low level of
educational requirements for daladala workers is common knowledge in
Dar es Salaam, as indicated in this ironic advert quoted from a
whimsical Swahili article by a local journalist (Majira 18.1.1998) :
Daladala conductor wanted. He has to have studied until the seventh level, if
not until the fourth level. If not provided with a fourth level class, he has to
be able to count money and to give back to the passengers the right change.
The irony encompasses the fundamental fact that any man can become
a daladala conductor. The qualifications necessary to become a daladala
driver apparently present a greater challenge, with an initial capital of
50,000 shillings being needed to acquire a driving licence. However,
fake driving licences can be easily bought in Dar es Salaam for one-
tenth of this sum. The ease of access to the market results in its over-
supply, and this in turn weakens the position of employees. Of those
workers questioned, 82.9% were employed not only without a written
contract, but without a fixed wage. In a strict sense, workers are not
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‘waged’ ; rather they operate the bus each day as a kind of franchise,
for which they must pay a fixed daily fee.* The exploitative nature of
employer}employee relations is therefore not formalised in any
‘agreement ’ on the workers’ wages or conditions of service in the
workplace, but lies in the cost set upon the franchise each day. In
theory, this fee is negotiable. In practice, the scope that employees have
to bargain is severely curtailed by the nature of the labour market. A
driver temporarily ‘on the bench’ (note, again, the use of a football
metaphor) explained the predicament to me in graphic terms
(Mashaka 1998) :
As too many of us are jobless, if for instance a bus owner is looking for a driver,
he will find more than fifty people just at this station [i.e. Mwenge station].
That is why they can ask you whatever they want and you have to accept it.
I have been working with the same bus for two years. He used to ask me for
50,000 shillings every day. Since then the buses have become too many and
the chance of making money has decreased. I went to my employer and I told
him 50,000 was not possible anymore. He could not understand me and he
wanted his bus keys back. He gave the bus to somebody else and he is still
working with it. I do not know if he manages to give him back 50,000 every
day.
In these circumstances, bus owners can ‘squeeze’ the fees charged to
employees upwards, so that in order to maintain a stable level of
income, drivers and conductors are pressed to make a greater number
of journeys and to carry more passengers. The magnitude of the
worker’s daily return must inevitably depend on these two factors. The
number of journeys per day is determined by the speed of the driver in
negotiating the city traffic, and the number of hours of daily work. The
principal limiting factor on the length of the working day is the demand
for transportation, a fact confirmed in uniform responses to the
questionnaire indicating that the average working day lasts 15 hours.
If the working day is fixed by diminishing demand, then speed of travel
remains the crucial variable. Under these circumstances, as another
driver explained, the link between workers’ exploitation and the high
number of road accidents becomes clear (Ramadhan 1998) :
My owner wants 30,000"! shillings every day. If I drive without speeding I will
work for the whole day to gain only the money the owner wants back at the
end of the day. For these reasons we are forced to speed from 5 a.m. to 9 p.m.
Then they say too many accidents, how much energy should we have?
To maximise the return on each trip, drivers therefore speed.
Conductors contribute to maximise the margin by cramming in as
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Table 6























Adults 5 6 8 15 30 30 50 70 100 150
Students 1 1 1 5 5 15 20 20 30 50
Sources : Shirika la Usafiri Dar es Salaam 1994 : 24 ; Daily News 8.1.1995, 31.12.1996.
many passengers as possible. This strategy implies that the vehicles will
be systematically overloaded, but it also means that conductors will
seek to maximise the return on each trip. Similarly, attempts to assign
daladala to specific routes, in order to provide a public service, may be
ignored by drivers if the returns obtained from operating on quieter,
less busy routes are perceived to be too low. With these factors in mind,
it becomes clear that many of the inefficiencies characterising the Dar
es Salaam transport system are, in fact, a consequence of the
exploitative conditions of employment governing the earning capacity
of employees. In reacting to these conditions, workers’ engage in
systematic violations of safety rules and regulations whose compliance
should be the goal of any well-managed passenger transport system.
Another important consequence of the exploitative relations of
production between bus owners and workers is the daily conflict
between workers and the beneficiaries of the welfare state. A useful case
to illustrate the social conflict generated by the withdrawal of the
government from transport provision is the history of the difficult
relationship between daladala workers and students. The tariff policy of
the government towards the students up until the early 1980s reflects
how the social function of the service was then given priority over
company profit. In 1983, when private operators entered the transport
system, the government still retained power to determine tariffs, and
attempted to compel private operators to adopt the privileged tariff
conceded to students. Tariffs were controlled by the government until
1996, and between 1983 and 1996 students formally retained the
privilege of a ‘ social ’ fare on all daladala routes in the city. Over this
period the ratio of student to ordinary adult tariffs fluctuated from 1 :
8 in 1989 to 1 :2 in 1992. Even at their lowest level of social protection,
students were accordingly paying half the tariff charged to adult
passengers.
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Given the characteristics of the franchise system operating in the
transport labour market, it will be clear that the burden of the state’s
welfare policy towards students fell squarely upon the daladala workers.
The state has at no time subsidised the economic loss incurred by bus
owners for the transportation of students ; nor do workers receive a
discount from owners on the amount of money they are asked for at the
end of the working day in relation to the numbers of students
transported. The arena of conflict between the two parties is thus
clearly defined: students are entitled to concessionary tariffs on any
daladala journey, but conductors can only grant those concessions at a
cost to their own income. Not surprisingly, clashes between daladala
workers and students have become a common feature of the Dar es
Salaam transport system, with incidents frequently being reported in
the press. During the ‘Day of the African Child’ in 1991, for example,
a delegation of children urged President Mwinyi ‘ to offer them
protection against daladala bus operators ’ (Daily News 18.6.1991). As
local reports reiterate, it is a conflict with victims on both sides.""
Daladala workers have been taken before the courts and fined (Daily
News 25.7.1992 ; Uhuru 11.6.1994 ; Majira 24.9.1994), while in 1992 a
delegation of workers met with the minister of home affairs to find a
solution to the abuses suffered by drivers and conductors as a result of
the students (Daily News 10.3.1992). Government officials have
threatened to withdraw licences from operators for failure to comply
with student tariffs, and the actual withdrawal of licences has been
reported (Daily News 27.7.1991, 6.3.1992, 23.03.1993, 24.3.1995 ;
Nipashe 30.3.1995). Police have also been called to defend students from
harassment by bus crews, when they had protested over fares (Daily
News 11.08.1992, 14.08.1996).
Attempts have been made to reconcile this conflict by imposing
limits on the number of students that may be carried by buses on each
journey. Until 1993, government regulations stipulated that small
buses should carry a limit of five students per trip, and larger buses up
to ten students. But on 26 May 1993, the minister of home affairs
announced that this was proving insufficient to meet demand, and that
daladala would be compelled to transport an unlimited number of
students until 7.30 a.m. each morning, so that they could attend school
on time (Uhuru 27.5.1993). In response to this government decree, no
private buses appeared on the roads of Dar es Salaam the following day
until after 7.30 a.m (Daily News 28.5.1993),"# vividly demonstrating the
incapacity of the state to enforce its own regulatory devices. It is also
apparent that the state itself is divided over the emphasis to be given
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in public policy in this area, with different ministries holding conflicting
views. In November 1998, for example, a press release from the
Ministry of Communication and Transport (1998) sought to better
protect daladala workers and reverse the intentions of the minister of
home affairs, by prescribing that ‘ small buses should carry three
students per trip, big buses five’. In practice, none of these interventions
has proved effective. The main cause of conflict between students and
private bus workers is that workers are asked to pay the price of
students ’ protection, and this has not been tackled by government.
Moreover, the public perceive that the government now lacks the
capacity to intervene successfully. As one daladala worker joked, ‘ they
[the government] are strong like Coca-cola ’ (Airi 1998) ; and, as
everyone knows, Coca-cola is a soft drink.
the DALADALA owners ’ association
In place of over-idealised conceptions about their supposed universal
benefits, the privatisation and deregulation of the Dar es Salaam
transport system has led to the emergence of sharp conflicts, both
between employees and employers, and between workers and students,
fiercely competing over the distribution of the costs and benefits of the
market. How successfully have the daladala owners adapted to these
new conditions? Nominally, Dar es Salaam’s private bus owners have
an association – MUWADA (Muungano wa watu wanaosafirisha
daladala) – to defend their commercial interests in these struggles. The
association was formed in 1983, only some two weeks after the decision
that allowed private buses to operate legally in Dar es Salaam.
MUWADA was founded on the initiative of a daladala owner, Ghalim
Kassim Dibbu, who brought together a group of private urban
transport entrepreneurs to cope with the various problems emerging in
running their businesses (Uhuru 16.4.1983). This group of daladala
entrepreneurs drew up the association statute, and then submitted their
proposed constitution to UDA which scrutinised the document to
establish ‘ its compliance with the founding principles of the nation’
(Uhuru 30.05.1983). Having been judged to be in keeping with national
policy on ‘associationism’, the statute was approved five months later,
in May 1983. What this meant, in practical terms, was that MUWADA
had been accepted as legitimately representing the interests of all those
within the sector, and as such was officially recognised as ‘ the only
association of daladala owners in Dar es Salaam’ (MUWADA 1983 : 3).
privatisation of dar es salaam transport system 151
In this sense, it is significant to note that the opening of urban transport
provision to private operators did not then imply a formal revision of
the principles behind ujamaa. MUWADA was not to be a voluntary
association of daladala owners at this stage; rather, membership was to
be a compulsory requirement for all of those who wished to operate
private bus services within Dar es Salaam. The statute of MUWADA
in fact represented one of the last enforcements of this corporative
principle. In 1984, the Tanzanian parliament formally recognised
freedom of association as a principle granted under constitutional law
(URT 1998 : 24). This had the effect of making MUWADA’s original
statute unconstitutional, but, as we shall see, in practice the government
continued to treat MUWADA as if no such change had taken place.
Apart from the two newspaper articles documenting the date of
foundation and the modalities of the statute approval, little was heard
of MUWADA over the next few years. A study funded by the World
Bank, to improve urban passenger transport in Dar es Salaam, even
claimed that ‘ the association of private operators, formed when private
buses were legalised, has since become inactive ’ (Wilbur Smith
Associates 1991 : 5). This perception changed dramatically from 1991,
since when MUWADA’s activities have been constantly reported in
the local press. The new activism coincided with a change in the
leadership of the association, George Ndaombwa being elected as
president early in 1991 (Ndaombwa 1998).
A few months after Ndaombwa’s election, the minister of home
affairs, Mrema, announced that all daladala drivers and conductors
were to wear blue uniforms with badges for ease of identification (Daily
News 28.6.1991). The measure was aimed ‘at restoring discipline of
daladala crew and reducing the rising number of traffic offences ’ which
were then considered to be reaching ‘alarming proportions ’ (ibid.).
Although the daladala crews were predictably slow to take up this
initiative, and the declaration had to be reissued in an attempt to
encourage compliance (Mtanzania 26.6.1998), the measure was actively
supported by MUWADA. The reason for this support was that
MUWADA had been granted a monopoly of the making and selling of
badges, from which the association was able to draw an important
source of income. The status of the organisation was further reinforced
by government during 1993, when the minister of communication and
transport announced that ‘owners of daladala would not be given
licences unless they joined MUWADA’, at the same time declaring
MUWADA to be ‘the only recognised organ which would help the
Government in solving daladala problems’ (Daily News 13.2.1993). This
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ministerial statement was an endorsement of the position stated in
MUWADA’s pre-1984 statute, but ignored the changes made during
1984 to Tanzanian law on freedom of association. Whatever the correct
legal position may have been, by September press reports documented
vehicles actually impounded for not carrying MUWADA badges
(Daily News 18.09.1993), and daladala operators were under pressure to
comply with the decree. Having been founded as an association of
private operators of daladala, MUWADA has become an association
profiting from private operators. In practice, it is now the duty of
private operators to prove they have joined MUWADA, the proof
being the display of an association sticker, which is nowadays sold at
the price of 3,700 shillings and is valid for one year.
How, then, have the bus owners reacted to this costly imposition?
The economic reality is more ambiguous than it may at first seem.
Stickers are sold by MUWADA without any reference to the legal
status of the bus. In other words, both private and pirate buses are
potential purchasers of the sticker. Therefore, among those buses
carrying the MUWADA sticker may be many that have not complied
with other legal requirements of registration. Whether an owner
chooses to purchase a MUWADA sticker or not will depend on a
number of related issues, but owners can broadly be grouped in three
categories. In the first category are owners who have rejected the
MUWADA sticker as an unnecessary and illegitimate imposition.
However, as a daladala worker explains, the burden of this decision
inevitably falls on the workers (Baghdadi 1998) :
When I told my employer that we are requested the sticker of MUWADA, he
told us that MUWADA and daladala are two different things. They cannot
force you to join the association and therefore the sticker is not necessary. The
police, they have a different story. They stop you and ask where the sticker is.
If you say that they cannot force one to join MUWADA they answer that it
is not true and they want to take the bus to the police station. But we cannot
go to the police station because at the end of the day the bus owner wants his
money and does not care about MUWADA, the police or anything else. So we
workers give a little something to the police and we go back to work.
In contrast, a second category of daladala entrepreneur opts for non-
compliance while personally paying the cost of his decision. In this case,
the buses are operated by kin, often by sons, and so the owner is
prepared himself to carry the costs of these ‘extras ’. As one daladala
owner explained (Omari 1998) :
Badges, stickers, uniforms and so on, these are all useless things. They invent
one after another and it is expensive and a waste of time to follow them. We
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count amongst the management costs that constantly you have to give a little
to the police and at least we do not have to go every now and then to
MUWADA.
Lastly, there is a third group of entrepreneurs who refuse to purchase
the sticker, and who also refuse to shift the costs onto their workers.
People belonging to this group obviously do not need MUWADA to
defend their interests (Maiko 1998) :
We can work without MUWADA badge because of our employer. He is very
well known; he has owned daladala for a long time. So if the police stop us and
we start showing them the bus documents, they will understand that they have
stopped the bus of our employer, and he is well known, respected … We do not
worry about these things.
If MUWADA can be seen to have become a direct burden upon
private bus owners, it must be acknowledged that it has conspicuously
failed in its efforts to mobilise in their interests in other respects also.
This is most evident in discussion of tariffs, where MUWADA has
consistently campaigned for raising fares (Uhuru 5.10.1993). However,
while MUWADA’s president has been calling for fares to rise by up to
300% (Majira 11.11.1994), the government’s deregulation of the fare
structure in 1996 in fact led to a downward trend in tariffs. Therefore,
as an overall conclusion on the influence of the ‘ informal political
sector ’ in the defence of the interests of bus owners, MUWADA seems
to be an institution that is singularly ineffective in influencing the
government’s policies, but effective as a private rent-seeking institution.
: : :
The positive consequence of the change from state monopoly to a
privatised and deregulated bus service in Dar es Salaam has been most
evident on the supply side. Since the early ’nineties, following fifteen
years characterised by transport shortages, Dar es Salaam’s private
buses have managed to meet the demand for transport. Given what is
known about the small scale of most enterprises operating within the
daladala sector, it is relevant to ask where all the additional buses came
from to so expand the market, and how their purchase was financed.
It should be understood which entrepreneurs have taken advantage of
newly available investment opportunities as the Tanzanian financial
sector liberalised; and whether privatisation has indeed drawn new
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investors into the daladala business, thus broadening the ownership of
assets. Regrettably, the process of licence registration does not make it
possible to identify specific investors in each daladala business, and so
the extent of these processes must for now remain a matter of
speculation. But, in understanding the constraints and opportunities
operating in the transport sector as a consequence of deregulation, it
would clearly be important to know more about investment and return
for those funding bus purchases.
On the other hand, it can be argued that the transport market in Dar
es Salaam is now over-supplied, and that this in part derives from a lack
of state control over conditions of entry to that market and regulation
of standards within the market. Competition between an excessive
number of private operators has manifested itself in speeding,
overloading of vehicles, and reluctance to comply with public policy
directives on concessionary tariffs. The findings of this study suggest
that these failings can best be explained by the nature of the
exploitative labour relations prevailing within the daladala sector,
conditions of service that apply equally to those buses legally registered
and to pirate operators who lack the required registrations. A lack of
effective regulation on working conditions allows bus owners to take
advantage of the oversupply of the labour market to protect their own
margins of profit at the cost of their workers and}or passengers. Long
working days and no security of employment are imposed on a mass of
casual workers in the private sector. Their attempt to make the best out
of a difficult situation in turn threatens the safety of all passengers
through speeding and overloading. This conclusion stands in sharp
contradiction to the pronouncements of the World Bank on labour
legislation in SSA. While the World Bank (1995 : 17) asserts that
‘regardless of the intention of such direct interventions in labour
markets, the legacy has not been positive ’, this article has demonstrated
the social cost of informality in Dar es Salaam’s transport labour
market. A state acting for the protection of workers, and perhaps
increased investment in infrastructure, seems the only likely solution to
the problems evident in Dar es Salaam’s deregulated transport system.
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appendix : questionnaire and summary of results"
average
1. Umri (Age) 30.2
2. (a) Dereva (Driver) 48%
(b) Kondakta (Conductor) 52%
3. Tangu lini umeanza kufanya shuguli za daladala?
Since when have you been working with private buses?
4. Umeshafanya kazi kwenye daladala ngapi?
How many daladala have you worked on? 1.56 daladala}year#
5. Umeajiriwa kama (Are you employed):
(a) mkataba? (with contract?) 17.1%
(b) kibarua? (without contract?) 82.9%
6. Unafanya kazi kwenye (Which make of bus do you work with?)$:
(a) Toyota Hiace 43.9%
(b) Isuzu Coaster 17.8%
(c) Toyota DCM 38.3%
7. Kwa mwezi unalipwa kiasi gani? (What is your monthly wage?) 34,672 shillings
Kwa siku posho kiasi gani unapata? (What is your daily income?)
67.6% answers ‘‘ it depends ’’
32.4% answers, average 2,654 shillings
8. Kwa wiki unafanya kazi siku ngapi?(How many days per week do you work?) 6.67
9. Kwa siku masaa mangapi ya kazi? (How many hours per day?) 14.9
10. Uhusiano gani na mwenye gari? (What is your relationship with the owner of the bus?)
(a) Jamaa (Relative) 7.8%
(b) Rafiki (Friend) 1.7%
(c) Mwenye gari tu (Purely business) 90.7%
" This questionnaire was completed by a sample of 668 workers.
# This figure is the ratio between the mean of question 3 and that of question 4.
$ This question aimed to estimate the total number of daladala employees. This was possible as
both (b) and (c) employ three workers (one driver and two conductors) while (a), small bus
for up to 20 people, employs only two workers.
notes
1. This paper is based on three months fieldwork carried out in Dar es Salaam between
September and December 1998, for my dissertation at the Istituto Universitario Orientale, Naples
(Italy), during which period interviews and a questionnaire were conducted in the city with bus
workers and owners, and documentary and newspaper sources were consulted at various
ministries and libraries. A short research report has been published in Italian (Rizzo 1999).
2. For evidence from South Africa on the limits of privatisation and deregulation in the urban
transport sector, see Xhosa 1992, McCaul 1990. On the limits of the deregulation in the
Tanzanian agricultural sector see Bryceson 1993 ; Havnevik 1993 : 287–313 ; Putterman 1995.
3. UDA fleet repair was further complicated by the presence of five different bus types
(Godard & Turnier 1992 : 53), deriving from four different aid programmes funded, respectively,
by Hungary, Japan, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany (Wilbur Smith
Associates 1991 : 3–4).
4. For the impact of state crisis on Dar es Salaam City Council capacity to maintain a road
system in good condition, see Kulaba 1989 : 240.
5. The name daladala comes from the name of the 5 shilling coin used to pay for a trip in 1983.
As 5 shillings was equivalent to $1, dala was the Swahilisation of dollar.
6. Since 1991 estimates have been obtained by keeping the 1991 private}pirate ratio constant.
7. The East African, 21.7.1999, accessed at
!http:}}www.nationaudio.com}News}EastAfrican}190799}Regional}Regional1.html"
8. The Tanzania Revenue Authority does not keep a centralised record of the data. The figure
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of 3,029 is obtained by the sum of the operators registered by Ilala District (1,254), Kinondoni
District (1,058) and Temeke District (717) (TRA 1998a, b, c).
9. For evidence of the identical labour relationship in the Kinshasa transport system, see Pain
1984 : 174, quoted in Stren 1988 : 233.
10. As the reader will have noted, this figure differs substantially from the previous one.
However, what differs is the size of the bus operated, not the amount of work demanded.
11. See Daily News 5.5.1993, reporting on a conductor beaten to death by a group of students.
12. It is worth underlining the changing nature of social conflict in the transport system. In the
early eighties, as Tripp (1997 : 1) reports, people’s notion of justice spontaneously united them to
contest the legitimacy of the banning of private buses : ‘A group of about forty Dar es Salaam
passengers had boarded a privately owned daladala minibus to go to work. On their way they were
stopped by a police officer. … Realising they would be in trouble, the passengers, who up until
that moment had been perfect strangers, spontaneously transformed themselves into one big,
happy family on its way to a wedding and started singing, clapping, and making shrill, ululating
sounds, as is the custom for people on their way to celebrations. The police, unable to charge the
driver for operating a bus on a commercial basis, had no choice but to let them go. ’ Ten years
later people’s notion of justice has been replaced by competing interests embodying different
notions of justice, as daladala workers ’ spontaneous refusal to transport students shows.
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